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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No, 870290-CA 
v. : 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
This appeal is from a conviction of Attempted Tampering 
with Evidence, a Class A Misdemeanor, in vioXation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-8-510 (1978) after a trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
1. Whether based upon the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the verdict, reasonable men roust have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that defendant committed the offense of Attempted Tampering 
with Evidence. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed between 
the co-defendants prior to admitting the nqn-hearsay co-
conspirator statements. 
3* Whether the trial court erre4 in not compelling the 
State to respond to defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
CQH5TITyTIQH^^£B5YISIQH5x-SIA3^1£5^^MD^BIJLES 
Utah R. Evid. 104(a) provides: 
Questions of admissibility generally. 
Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b)• In making its determination 
it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges. 
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)2)(E) provides: 
Statements which are not hearsay. 
A Statement is not hearsay if 
The statement is offered against a party and 
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of 
a party during the course and in the 
furtherance of the conspiracy 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982) provides: 
An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating is concise terms the definitions of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as time, place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. 
Neither presumptions of law not matters of 
judicial notice need be stated. 
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Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982) provides. 
When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. 
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or 
within ten days thereafter, or at siich later 
time as the court may permit. The pourt may, 
on its own motion, direct the filind of a 
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at ahy time 
subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a 
bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to 
set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978) provides: 
Attempt—Elements of offense—(1) For 
purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the offense, he engages 
in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, ctonduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of th^ actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt 
shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed; or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978)provides: 
Tampering with evidence—A person commits 
a felony of the second degree if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
STATEMENT_Of_TflE_C&S£ 
Defendant, Claude Donald Harman, was charged by 
Indictment with Criminal Conspiracy, a Third Degree Felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201 (1978) , Tampering with 
Evidence, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-510 (1978), Tampering with a Witness, a Third Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-508 (1978), and 
Official Misconduct, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-201 (1978). 
Defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering with 
Evidence in a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through March 6, 
1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, 
presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge Uno to perform 600 
hours of community service in lieu of jail, to pay a fine of 
$2,500, and to remain on court supervised probation for a period 
of 18 months (R. 504). 
On May 1, 1983, a fire occured at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah (R. 540 at p. 272). The 
damages caused by the fire were in excess of one million dollars 
including damages to the office of Dr. Joe Culbertson, a Salt 
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Lake County employee in the Mental Health Department (R. 540 at 
pp. 274, 286, and 359). After the fire had been extinguished, C. 
Dean Larsen, Assistant Chief and Fire Marshall for the Murray 
City Fire Department, reported that in his opinion the fire 
originated in the office of Dr. Culbertson due to the misuse of 
an extension cord and space heater (R. 540 at pp. 268, and 285-
86) . 
The next day, Evan Stephens, the Risk Manager for Salt 
Lake County, requested Bill Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil 
Division for the Salt Lake County Attorney's| Office, to begin an 
investigation into the cause and origin of the fire due to the 
possible liability facing the County (R. 54(j at pp. 346, and 363; 
R. 541 at p. 499). In response, a request fjor investigative 
assistance was sent to defendant who was then the Chief 
Investigator for the County Attorney's Office (R. 529 at pp. 116 
and 126)• Defendant assigned investigators Ralph Tolman and Olin 
Yearby to assist Murray City Fire Department in determining the 
cause and origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1233). 
On Monday, May 2, 1985, Tolman an£ Yearby went to the 
fire scene and assisted Chief Larsen in performing a "dig-down" 
in Culbertson1s office (R. 532 at p. 1233). Larsen explained to 
Tolman his theory that the space heater in Culbertson1s office 
was the cause of the fire. Id. 
On May 3, 1988, Tolman informed Mr. Stephens that he 
concurred with Mr. Larsen1s opinion that the fire originated in 
the County offices (R. 532 at p. 1236). Concerned about the 
County's liability, Mr. Stephens obtained authorization to hire 
-5-
Jim Ashby, a private fire investigator, to determine the cause 
and origin of the fire (R. 541 at p. 384-85). Mr. Stephens wrote 
defendant a letter on May 5, 1983 thanking him for the 
investigative assistance, explaining the County's exposure to 
substantial liability, and notifying him that an outside fire 
expert had been retained. Id. (Statefs Exhibit 12.) 
Subsequently, the space heater cord was examined by an 
independent laboratory which determined that the heater could not 
have been the cause of the fire since it was not energized at the 
time of the fire (R. 532 at p. 659). Based upon the laboratory 
results and his independent investigation, Mr. Ashby filed a 
cause and origin report on June 6, 1983 concluding that the fire 
originated in the attic above the county offices (R. 536 at pp. 
659-662) (State's Exhibit 18). 
On June 21, 1983, Tolman prepared a case closure form 
which was rejected by his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson, 
because it lacked a report on the fire (R. 532 at p. 124) 
(State's Exhibit 22). On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted his 
seven-page report to Mr. Dawson who refused to accept it stating 
that it "parroted" Larsen's fire report, it did not state the 
sources relied upon, and it made the County look bad (R. 532 at 
p. 1244) (State's Exhibit 8) (Sfifi Appendix "A"). At Tolman's 
insistence, Dawson passed the report on to defendant for review 
(R. 532 at p. 1245). Several days later, defendant called Tolman 
into his office regarding the report. Id* Defendant informed 
Tolman that his report was unacceptable, that it "parroted" 
Larsen's report, that it made the County look bad, and ordered 
him to prepare a more concise report which referred to Ashbyvs 
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favorable report (R. 535 at 869; R. 541 at pp. 444, 509 and 561; 
R. 536 at pp. 665, 696, 702 and 748; R. 530 at pp. 14-16 and 44; 
R. 532 at 1246). Harman further ordered Tolman to shit can, 
destroy, deep six, shred, get rid of, and tear up the seven page 
report and submit a one-page, short report which did not identify 
the origin and source of the fire (R. 530 at p. 16; R. 535 at pp. 
919 and 940; R. 530 at pp. 19 and 29; R. 530 dt p. 16; R. 535 at 
p. 869; R. 536 at p. 747; R. 535 at p. 924; R< 530 at p. 15). 
On August 25, 1983, Tolman submitted a one-page report 
excluding any opinions as to the fire origin &nd simply referring 
to Ashby*s report (State's Exhibit 7) (£££ Appendix "B"). The 
report was quickly approved, signed by defendant, and placed in 
the master file thus closing the case (R. 536 at pp. 752-53)• 
Prior to the rejection of the seven page report, Tolman 
had given Dean Larsen a courtesy copy of the report as a matter 
of inter-agency cooperation (R. 532 at pp. 1255-56). After the 
report was rejected by defendant, Tolman telephoned Larsen and 
told him that defendant wanted the report destroyed because it 
could cost the County millions (R. 535 at 91^). Tolman asked 
Larsen to get rid of the report. Id* 
In November, 1985, Larsen revealed the existence of the 
seven-page report during a civil deposition inquiring into the 
cause of the fire (R. 535 at pp. 932 and 938). Larsen testified 
at the deposition that defendant had ordered Tolman to destroy 
the report (R. 535 at p. 940). Soon after, the media reported 
that a cover-up existed in the County Attorney's Office regarding 
the investigative fire report (R. 530 at p. 9)• 
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In 1986, a Salt Lake County Grand Jury was called to 
investigate possible criminal charges related to the alleged 
cover-up of reports regarding the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza fire (R. 537 at p. 1020). The Grand Jury subsequently 
indicted defendant and Tolman for Criminal Conspiracy, Tampering 
with a Witness, Tampering with Evidence, and Official Misconduct 
(R. 206). After a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through 
March 6, 1987, defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering 
with Evidence (R. 505). 
£U!$MMX_QF_MGUMENT 
Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the 
jury's finding that defendant committed the offense of Tampering 
with Evidence. It was the exclusive prerogative of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and the jury could have found defendant 
committed the offense despite any evidence to the contrary. 
The trial court properly found by a preponderance of 
the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that defendant was a 
party to that conspiracy thus admitting the co-conspirator's 
statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). The trial 
court was not required to make a pre-trial determination of the 
admissibility of the co-conspirator's statements nor was it 
required to restate the reasoning and evidence relied upon in 
making its determination. 
Because defendant failed to pursue his Motion for a 
Bill of Particulars, the trial court did not err in failing to 
compel the prosecution to respond. Defendant's motion was 
improper in that it sought to obtain a review of the evidence and 
-8-
limit the State's alternative avenues of proqf. In any event, 
defendant was not prejudiced by the State*s failure to respond 
since the Indictment was sufficient, defendant had copies of all 
relevant grand jury testimony, and defendant had access to the 
prosecutor's files. 
EQIUX-I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE 
OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE. 
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient 
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction. A review 
of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is 
without merit. 
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Siaie_YjL_B2fij££x, 
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the 
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard 
of review is narrow. 
"tW]e review the evidence and dll 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction 
for insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." JSiflifi 
Xx_££Jti:££f Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983); 
aSCfitd fiiflifi-.Xx«8JcCfli:dfillr Utah, $52 P.2d 
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility Of the 
witnesses. . . . " SJfcflJ;s_XjL_L£miD, Utah, 606 
P.2d 229, 231 (1980); flCCfltd £Jtai£_JU_.LiJld£I)r 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. • . • 
T*_ *<- ^ 4* fenmhasis in original). 
Defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering with 
Evidence* An Attempt is defined as follows: 
Attempt—Elements of offense—(1) For 
purposes of this part a person is guilty of 
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with 
the kind of culpability otherwise required 
for the commission of the offense, he engages 
in conduct constituting a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step unless 
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's 
intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt 
shall arise: 
(a) Because the offense attempted was 
actually committed? or 
(b) Due to factual or legal 
impossibility if the offense could have 
been committed had the attendant 
circumstances been as the actor believed 
them to be. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978). The criminal code further 
defines Tampering with Evidence as follows: 
Tampering with evidence—A person commits 
a felony of the second degree if, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation 
is pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or 
removes anything with a purpose to impair its 
verity or availability in the proceeding or 
investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything 
which he knows to be false with a purpose to 
deceive a public servant who is or may be 
engaged in a proceeding or investigation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978)• 
Thus, the elements of Attempted Tampering with Evidence 
are that a person (1) believe that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, and (2) 
engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
altering, destroying, concealing, or removing Anything with a 
purpose to impair its verity or availability ib the proceeding or 
investigation. 
A review of the voluminous evidence reveals that sworn 
testimony and evidence was offered to establish each and every 
element of the offense. Defendant himself testified that he 
assigned Ralph Tolman and Olin Yearby to conduct an official 
investigation into the cause and origin of the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire (R. 529 at pp. 125-27) (State's Exhibit 
11.) In response, Tolman prepared a seven-page report setting 
forth the investigative action taken, the information obtained, 
and the suspected origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1242) (State's 
Exhibit 8.) Tolman submitted the report to defendant for 
approval and gave a courtesy copy to Murray City Fire Marshall, 
Dean Larsen (R. 529 at p. 137; R. 532 at p. 1254). After 
reviewing the report, defendant called Tolman into his office and 
ordered Tolman to write a substitute report (R. 529 at pp. 146-
47). 
At trial and before the Grand Jury, Tolman testified 
that defendant did not like the first report because it made the 
County "look bad" and "liable" (R. 530 at p. 44; R. 532 at 1246). 
Defendant instead wanted a more concise report which simply 
referred to Ashby's favorable report (R. 532 at p. 1246). 
Wendell Coombs, Murray City Fire Chief, testified that Tolman had 
told him that defendant did not like the report because it made 
- i i -
the County "look bad" (R. 535 at p. 869). Joan Binkerd, a 
secretary in the County Attorney's Investigative Division, 
overheard defendant tell Tolman that the report made the County 
•look bad" and "liable" (R. 536 at p. 696). Sam Dawson, the 
Assistant Chief Investigator in the County Attorney's Office, was 
present when defendant told Tolman to write a substitute "short, 
one-page" report which referred to Ashby's report (R. 536 at p. 
747). 
Additionally, Dean Larsen, the Murray City Fire 
Marshall, testified that Tolman called him soon after defendant 
rejected the report and told Larsen that defendant was concerned 
that the report could cost the County millions and that defendant 
ordered the report to be destroyed (R. 535 at pp. 919 and 940). 
Larsen further stated that defendant wanted Tolman to write a 
substitute report with no conclusion (R. 535 at p. 924). 
Finally, John Harrington, a reporter for Channel Four 
News, testified that he had spoken with Tolman soon after the 
report was publicly released in 1985 and that Tolman explained 
how defendant had ordered the report to be "shit canned," "deep 
sixed," or "shredded" because it made the County look bad (R. 530 
at pp. 14, 16, 19 and 29). He also stated that Tolman said 
defendant wanted a substitute report with "no determination" (R. 
530 at p. 15) . 
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, a jury could 
reasonably conclude that defendant ordered Tolman to conceal or 
destroy the report in the official fire investigation with the 
purpose to impair the reports availability. Thus, the evidence 
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was sufficient to establish the requisite elements of the 
offense. 
Defendant further argues that the evidence was 
insufficient because some evidence tends to show that defendant 
did not order Tolman to destroy the report. In making his 
argument/ defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a 
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is 
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the 
credibility of the witness testimony. St;at5 v^  Lfrinnu 606 P.2d 
229, (Utah 1980); El£Q-Vi&Llb}i±iQnj.-In£jij.-X*-E&Llini 17 Utah 2d 
375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966). The basic function of the jury is 
to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom. 
SiaJtfi^ Y^ .EifilCfi# 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986). Respite testimony to 
the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that defendant committed the offense of which he was 
convicted £Jk3i£_yx_££±i££, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983). 
EQIH3LU 
THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE NON-HEARSAY 
CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 
801(d)(2) (E). 
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding 
that a conspiracy existed and that defendant was a party to that 
conspiracy thus making admissible the non-hearsay co-
conspirator's statements. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)2)(E) provides in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Statements which are not hearsay. 
A Statement is not hearsay if 
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The statement is offered against a party and 
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of 
a party during the course and in the 
furtherance of the conspiracy. 
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard to be applied to 
co-conspirator's statements in jSiflJt£_X.1.-.SlLay# 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 
1986) and noted as follows: 
We acknowledge the divergent authority on 
the subject and hold today, in accordance 
with the prevailing view, that the criminal 
venture and the defendant's participation 
therein must be established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. When applying the 
standard to determine whether to admit a co-
conspirator's hearsay statements, the court 
may consider the accused's own statements 
indicating his involvement in the conspiracy, 
as well as actions by the accused or the 
declarant. • . • 
Id. at 1319, (footnotes omitted). 
In the present case, the trial court permitted the 
prosecution to establish independently the criminal venture and 
defendant's participation therein prior to the admission of the 
co-conspirator's statements. At the time of the ruling, the 
State had established that Tolman had prepared a seven-page 
report concluding that the fire originated in the County offices, 
that defendant had rejected the report stating it made the County 
look liable, that defendant ordered Tolman to prepare a short, 
one-page report referring to Ashby's report which concludes the 
fire originated elsewhere, that Tolman submitted the one-page 
report as ordered deleting his investigative findings, and that 
defendant approved the one-page report (R. 536 at pp. 696 and 
747) (State's Exhibits 7 and 8). 
Based upon the independent evidence, the trial court 
found as follows: 
Based on testimony that has been given so 
far, the Court is of the opinion tjiat the 
evidence does show that there is some, either 
whether you call it cover-up or some evidence 
that would indicate that there is,Ion the 
part of the parties involved, an effort to 
not have the report that is the subject 
matter of this particular hearing not to be 
divulged publicly as far as the records of 
the county attorney is concerned. 
(R. 535 at p. 868). 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated iifi Siay, an appellate 
court "will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on 
questions of admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears 
that the lower court was in error." Siay* at 1316; Sss alSQr 
S£a££-X±-£Ql£* 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983). The trial court 
made its finding that the evidence established a cover-up by the 
parties to conceal the investigative report. Thus, the non-
hearsay co-conspirator statements were properly admitted. 
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by 
failing to hold a pretrial hearing on the aditiissibility of the 
co-conspirator statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (R. 
29-30). Rule 104(a) provides as follows: 
Questions of admissibility generally. 
Preliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined 
by the court, subject to the provisions of 
subdivision (b). In making its determination 
it is not bound by the rules of evidence 
except those with respect to privileges. 
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Utah R. Evid. 104(a). Plainly, Rule 104(a) does not require a 
PIfiJtiial determination of admissibility, but rather, that the 
determination be made preliminary to the admission of the 
evidence. This view is in accord with the Supreme Courtfs ruling 
in SldX which would permit a conspiratorfs statements to be 
provisionally admitted subject to eventual independent proof and 
a finding of admissibility before the case is submitted to the 
jury. £iay at 1319. (S££ alss, Efiilliaily-YA«yDited^ 5Jtfltfifi# 4 83 
U.S. , 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (June 23, 1987); Ufliifid 
S£atea-x±-lahnaani 757 F.2d i486 (4th cir. 1985); uniifid-Siai£s 
XjL-YlnSflDr 606 F.2d 149 (6th Ci r . 1979), fifiJLfc. dfiQifid/ 444 U.S. 
1074 (1980); and UDite^SiSiefi.s^fiiDfifi, 717 F.2d 1481, 1488 (4th 
Ci r . 1983) in te rpre t ing the analogous Federal Rules of Evidence). 
Accordingly, the t r i a l court did not er r in f a i l i ng to hold a 
p r e t r i a l hearing regarding the admiss ib i l i ty of the co-
conspirator s ta tements . 
Defendant f i na l ly urges tha t the t r i a l court erred by 
f a i l i ng to specify the reasoning and evidence r e l i ed upon in 
making i t s finding of admis s ib i l i t y . On t h i s po in t , the Utah 
Supreme Court in QLSZ merely required the t r i a l court to make the 
finding of admiss ib i l i ty on the record and npt t ha t the t r i a l 
court r e s t a t e the evidence re l i ed upon in i t s r u l i n g . Stay a t 
1319. The Tenth Ci rcu i t Court of Appeals concurs tha t a t r i a l 
court need not pinpoint the evidence r e l i ed upon. SJlLLfc£d_S.tai£.S 
Xx^CfltUfi^EiDS-EflfiJsiDg^CQ.L^inCxf 793 F.2d 232, 242 (10th Ci r . 
1986); ACCflid UDJLtfi^SJtfligfi^X^Buclifll)Jan# 787 F.2d 477 (10th Ci r . 
1986)• As noted e a r l i e r , the prosecution had es tabl ished 
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PQIHIJJJ 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT COMPELLING THE 
PROSECUTION TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not 
compelling the prosecution to provide a Bill of Particulars 
setting forth the manner in which defendant allegedly committed 
the offense. Defendant's claim lack merit. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b) requires that an offense be 
charged as follows: 
An indictment or information shall charge 
the offense for which the defendant is being 
prosecuted by using the name given to the 
offense by common law or by statute or by 
stating is concise terms the definitions of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant 
notice of the charge. As information may 
contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause 
to sustain the offense charged where 
appropriate. Such things as timef place, 
means, intent, manner, value and ownership 
need not be alleged unless necessary to 
charge the offense. Such things as money, 
securities, written instruments, pictures, 
statutes and judgments may be described by 
any name or description by which they are 
generally known or by which they may be 
identified without setting forth a copy. 
However, details concerning such things may 
be obtained through a bill of particulars. 
Neither presumptions of law not matters of 
judicial notice need be stated. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982). Additionally, Rule 4(e) 
provides for a Bill of Particulars under the following 
circumstances: 
When facts not set out in an information 
or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the 
offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a 
written motion for a bill of particulars. 
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The motion shall be filed at arraignment or 
within ten days thereafter, or at such later 
time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a 
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time 
subject to such conditions as justice may 
require. The request for and contents of a 
bill of particulars shall be limited to a 
statement of factual information needed to 
set forth the essential elements of the 
particular offense charged. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982). 
In the present case, the offense of Tampering with 
Evidence was set forth in Count II of the Indictment as follows: 
That during the month of August 1983, in 
Salt Lake County, believing that an official 
proceeding or investigation was pending or 
about to be instituted, defendants Donald 
Claude Harman and Ralph Tolman did alter, 
destroy, conceal, or remove Ralph Tolman1s 
investigative report of August 1, 1983, with 
the purpose to impair it verity or avail-
ability in an official proceeding or ivnesti-
gation which was then pending or about to be 
instituted; all in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-8-510, a felony of the Second 
Degree. 
(R. 4). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars requesting that the prosecution (1) state the 
specific manner in which defendant was alleged to have impaired, 
altered, destroyed, concealed or removed the report and (2) 
provide a description of the official proceeding or investigation 
alleged to have been pending or about to be instituted as set 
forth in Count II (R. 31). At the same time, defendant filed a 
Request for Discovery seeking copies of all the grand jury 
transcripts of witness testimony concerning the charges against 
defendant (R. 27). 
At a pretrial hearing on January 23, 1987, defendant 
did not assert his Motion for Bill of Particulars, but instead, 
stated he may later pursue his motion depending on the court's 
ruling with respect to the grand jury transcripts (R. 538 at p. 
24)• Subsequently, the court ordered the prosecution to provide 
to defendant the grand jury transcripts (R. 116-119). 
Thereafter, defendant failed to pursue his Motion for a Bill of 
Particulars. Thus, the trial court did not deny defendant's 
motion but simply did not rule due to defendant's apparent 
abandonment. 
Upon analysis of the substance of defendant's motion, 
defendant's request was improper. The Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that the purpose of a Bill of Particulars is to provide to 
the accused whatever information the prosecutipn has that may fix 
the date, time, and place of the alleged offense. SiaJtjB-JU 
BQhhinSi 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985). However, the Court has 
clearly stated that a bill of particulars need not plead matters 
of evidence, nor is it to be used as a device to enable 
defendants to obtain a review of the prosecution's evidence. JLd• 
at 773; Sial£_yx_MiJtc2>£jJ.# 571 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Utah 1977); SJtalfi 
X±„tiQLaill£, 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 833 (1970); SU.te ¥,% 
MllLtfilBf 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875-76 (1964); Siate_Y, 
iACJS, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852, 855 (1950); ££fli£_JU_jLMD£SfiH# 
103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173, 175 (1943). 
In the present case, defendant requested discovery of 
the specific manner in which the prosecution intended to prove 
tampering, i^ fix by impairing, altering, destroying, concealing, 
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or removing the report (R. 31) . Clearly, defendant cannot 
attempt to "freeze" the State's case in advance of trial by 
precluding the State from utilizing evidence that may develop at 
trial. Defendants request was not to clarify a vague element of 
the crime, but rather, an effort to discover the State's evidence 
and limit the Statefs alternative avenues of proof, £se j§.ta.t£_y* 
BamfiBf 736 P.2d 1059, 1063-1064 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., 
dissenting); SJtaifi.^ -JBflPPflSr 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985). Thus, 
defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars was improper and 
cannot be grounds for error. 
In any event, the State's refusal to respond to 
defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars was harmless. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that an error is harmless where 
there is no substantial likelihood of a different result in the 
absence of the error. JSfifi Siaifi-Y^ -fliJiClnjSflDt 655 P.2d 635, 637 
(Utah 1982). As shown above, each and every element of the 
offense of Tampering with Evidence was clearly and specifically 
set forth in Count II of the Indictment as required by Rule 4(b) 
(R. 4). No further information was necessary to inform defendant 
of the nature and cause of the offense charged. Additionally, 
defendant was provided copies of all grand jury transcripts 
regarding the charged offense (R. 116-19). Further, defendant 
admits in his brief that prosecution offered defendant access to 
the prosecution files (Brief of Appellant at 19). Thus, it 
appears frivolous for defendant to claim he was denied an 
opportunity to adequately prepare his defense where the 
- 5 f t -
offense was clearly set forth in the Indictment, defendant had 
copies of all relevant grand jury testimony, and defendant had 
access to the prosecution's files* 
QQSQhU&IQl* 
Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ay of May, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN 
Assistant Attorney General 
CSBlIFI£A2E_QE_MAI£IMz 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Edward K. Brass, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East, 






Salt Lake County Attorneys Office 
Criminal Division 
ENSC A$RE*ORTE0 
rray Fire Assist 
CODE VIOLATION DATE REPORTED DATE OCCURRED CASE NUMBER 
83250 
OUTSIDC AGENCY ft CASE NUMBER 
PLAINANT 
rray Fire Dept. 
AODRESS RESIDENCE PHONE BUSINESS PHONE 
4TIONAL INFORMATION ft SYNOPSIS 
AUGUST 1, 1983 
Case: Assist in Salt Lake County Mental Health 
Fire, located at Fashion pi ace Professional 
Plaza 6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 84107. 
Date of fire: Sunday, May 1, 1983 at 0454 hours 
Murray Fire Department received the first report of 
fire at 0454 hours. The first responding engine came from Station 
#2, which is located on 6100 South just West of State Street. It 
came up 6100 South to 3rd East and went North to the Southside of 
the building. The first staging was on the Southside of the building 
and inch and a half preconnecting lines were broke out and fire 
fighters entered into the 2nd floor. The fire fighters crawled 
into the building and all they could find was smoke, not alot of 
super heated area. They backed out and went downstairs, broke out 
glass doors and found the same as listed above. 
Fire fighters came back out and tried to find the 
flames. The building was laddered, the roof was soft and spungy. 
The second engine arrived from Station #1, staged on Southside 
of building. Third engine arrived and staged on the Northside of 
building. Here was observed a lot of heavy smoke drifting North. 
The wind was from the South traveling 6 to 9 miles per hour on that 
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particular morning. The majority of smoke was omitting from the 
eaves on the structure, directly above DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office, East of the West entrance of the building on the Northside. 
This is the primary entrance Into the 2nd floor of the Salt Lake 
Mental Health area. 
At this point, a fourth alarm was called in, and 
Midvale Fire Department arrived. They attacked the fire from the 
Westside of the building, adjacent to 300 East. The fire had broke> 
through and was coming out the Westside area by the time of arrival 
of Midvale Fire Department. At approximately this same time, entrance 
was made by Murray Fire fighters into the West door on the North side, 
which makes entry directly into the Salt Lake County Mental Health 
area. Fire fighter SHANE STRATEN, knocked out a door and entry was 
made into the hallway. STRATEN could feel heat and see fire to his 
immediate left as he faced South. This is the hallway that runs 
inbetween DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S office and EDITH JAVENS office. 
Heat was too Intense at this point, and fire fighter STRATEN retreated 
from the building. Also, the roof was getting very spongy which 
created danger to fire fighers to be inside, and fire fighters that 
had been on the roof were also advised to retreat off the roof. 
The first water into the building on the Northside by 
Murray Fire, went through the window of DR. JOEL COLBERTSONfS office. 
Then as the roof collapsed, water was put over the walls into the 
main-stay area of the fire. This was the area of DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office, running directly South of EDITH JAVENS and DONNA LARSEN'S 
office. (See hand drawn diagram attached to report. This was the center 
of area of fire.) 
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The roof collapsed and copious amounts of water 
was poured into the center of fire. It was determined at this 
point, that this particular area was totally damaged and not 
recoverable and/or saveable. Firefighters then moved their 
primary effort to East and West areas of the building, to try 
and contain and save remainder. As fire fighting efforts were 
directed towards the East and West end of the building, the area 
directly South and West of DONNA LARSEN'S office, which belongs 
to a DR. SMITH, Dentist, a Nitro/dioxyide container approximately 
10 inches in diameter and 4 feet high, exited the building straight 
up in the air, approximately two or three hundred feet, landing 
North of the building in the parking lot approximately 300 feet 
from the building. In the same proximity of DR. SMITH'S office, 
where the Nitro/dioxyide was located, were two containers of pure 
oxygen of the same dimensions, which created massive additional 
fire load. This is a primary reason for additional extensive 
damages in this particular area. 
The false ceiling directly abov^ EDITH JAVEN'S office 
area, are the roof joists running East and W^st through the length 
of the building, adjacent to these joists were the ridged conduit 
electrical lines and natural gas pipe lines. When the roof collapsed 
and the air conditioning unit, which was on the roof, (dimensions 
approximately 4 x 6 x 4 feet) fell through the roof into EDITH 
JAVEN'S office. The natural gas lines were fractured and broken 
and bent down into the area, adding to fire load to this particular 
area. Unknown when natural gas to the entire building was shut off. 
Shortly after the central roof collapsed, this area was 
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and unhampered for approximately one (1) hour, while fire fighting 
efforts were directed towards the East and West ends of the 
building. 
On May 2f 1983 the day following the fire, this 
Investigator and SGT. OLIN YEARBY, from the County Attorney's 
Office, arrived to assist Assistant Fire Chief, Fire Marshall DEAN 
LARSON, in ascertaining the cause of the fire. Our attention was 
directed towards a space heater and extention cord in MR. JOEL 
COLBERTSON'S office. 
The following is a list of items sent to A.I.D. 
CONSULTING ENGINEERING INCORPORATED, 10830 Composit Drive, Dallas 
Texas 75220. Area code 214 350-8781. These items were sent for 
expert examination by a J.L. GILMORE, employed by the above firm, to 
ascertain if space heater was the cause of fire. The following 
items were sent: 
1. A non-fire damaged electric space heater, the same 
brand and type as damaged. 
2. Fire damaged space heater. 
3. Small burned electrical extention cord. 
4. Electrical receptical. 
5. 2nd piece of small electrical parallel lamp cord, 
apparently either serving as a lamp or some unknown appliance. 
The above items were sent on May 17, 1983 by myself and 
Chief DEAN LARSON. 
MR. J.L. GILMOREfS conclusion was as follows: 
"Based on our examination, we have found no related 
evidence that would indicate the existance of an electrical fault 
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submitted. Further, we have found no evidende that would support the 
cont ei"it I on t"haI !„he e 1 ec11 i cp 1[ ht> a ( er , c 1 c»ck radio or "1 amp was 
electrically energized at f lit ime of the fire. The small 
extention cord allegedly supplying a electridal power to a lamp, 
space heater ancil c 1 ock r adi o
 ( is bei ng use • ci in ei ivIroninent somc: • 
25 to 307. beyond it's rated capacity. This qould lead to an over 
temperature condition resulting damage to th^ installation and 
ultimately a fire. However, microscopic examination of t he stranded 
conductors, reveals no evidence that this extention cord was 
e 1 e c 11" i c a 11 y e r \ e r g i z e d a t t: I :t e 11 IT c o f t h e £ i re. *' 
This Agent was removed from the investigation of the 
fire approximately one week after being assigned Consequently 
in :i ext: ens I vc • an d fi i"1 1 I i ives 11 gat i on was nevei: consumat e d by this 
Agent This Agent's conclusions after approximately 5 days and 
several on-scene walk throughs, and dig down of the area, of 
DR JOEL COLBERTSON'S off I ce are as follows: 
The fire originated in the area of JOEL COLBERTSON'S 
office. Particularly the Southwest corner. Reasons: #1. The 
intensive low heat (floor level) on brick wall and I pattern on 
brick wall, goes directly down to area of metal file cabinet, 
approximate 1 ) "1 3 inches squai e Also the V pattern on the file 
cabinet, directs it to the floor area #2 The desk which was located 
on the Northwest corner against the wall, was totally consumed. The 
o n l y r e c o g n i / P !4ti> 1 fj H ' m a i n d e r bt'lnft a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 t,n ] 1 J tnrhe* 
of the bottom of the legs of the desk. My conception is that the fire 
originated in Southwest corner, crept up wall, consumed the bookcase 
above the metal file cabinet, fell down into this area arid conti iiiieci 
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climbing the Wi si wall to obtain the air to the Eastf where the 
entry door was located and opened, Along. Wes^ wall fi re coi itini led 
up and East, adjacent to this West wall was a hide-a-way bed. The 
springs were totally annealed on I he couch. All items on West 
end of office were totally consumed and eventually the fire climbing 
the wall, burning the metal grids holding the tile roof covering the 
false ceiling Thi s area becoming super "heated, to tl le poi nt where 
metal structures failed,, ti les fel 1 as one piece to the £1 oor area. 
Consequent! y, the carpet not destroyed until you get into the door 
entry area J* :*;* rating on the tile is one "hoi n whei I c: lipped, 
on undipped tile tr :;-t rating would be leps. Clipping meaning, 
stays hooki rij - ure. They Were not in place in 
this particular structure * * re burned ijito the false ceiling area 
and rapidly spread throughout the building. It appears that fire 
drafts were not constant and in continual 1ty with walls in false 
ceiling area, allowing fire to virtually move at will to where it 
could find air and fuel load. 
The area that was EIHXH JAVEN'S and DONNA LARSON'S 
office space, was somewhat more burned than JOEL COLBERTSON'S office. 
are: The fire was alloWed to burn freely for at 
least one hour in JAVENS & LARSON'S and DR. SMITH'S ai ea JOEL 
C0LBERTS0NfS office was almost as badly burned, but as stated before, 
the £ ix st watei into building wen - ,n J U L L COLBERTSON'S window and 
had to have had a hampering affect, slowing burning down here. 
Consequently, this Agent feels that DR. COLBERTSON'S office may have 
been virtually burned iinii prior i o waie? nnti'Mng, and/or fire 
departments arrival. The V pattern on entirf building structure 
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COLBERTSON'S office sustained substantial heatt for a 1axget 
period of time. The only place the fire actually broke through the 
eaves themselves, wa» where UK, COLBERTSON'S Office West wall 
adjoins to the outside North wall of structure. 
This Agent consequently places the origin in the 
Southwest corner, JOEL COLBERTSON' S office cai lse unknown. 
Attached to report are the Murray City Fire Department 
jnr i dpnf r^portK. 
APPENDIX B 
Supplementary Report 
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office 
Criminal Division 
FENSE AS REPORTED 
Fire 
CODE VIOLATION DATE REPORTED OATE OCCURRED CASE NUMBER 
83250 
OUTSIDE AGENCY ft CASE NUMBER 
MFLAINANT ADORESS RESIDENCE PHONE BUSINESS PHONE 
IDITIONAL INFORMATION ft SYNOPSIS 
AUGUST 25, 1983 
Case- Assist in Sail; la>e County Mental Health Fire 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza 
6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 8410 7 
Date of firei Sunday, Hay 1 ] 933 at 0452 hours. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * A A A 
This Investigator arrived in assist Mwrrav hire on 
Monday, May 963 I assisted in the process of digging thru 
BR COI Y • : o f : * . • v * 
On May 4th, r outside Investigator was hired by 
Salt Lake County It was at this time that II was removed from 
the case to prevent duplication of invesftgative efforts. 
No further action. 
IjB^^^™" 
irfAjfrkrftiaitfATm -d- \ 1 R l I OATI~ "y ' | APtROVfDBY f] 
